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Squeeze-outs, Freeze-outs, and Discounts: Why Is
Illinois in the Minority in Protecting Shareholder
Interests?
Charles W. Murdock*
I. INTRODUCTION
As contrasted with Delaware-a supposedly pro-management
statel-Illinois generally has been considered a pro-shareholder state.
Delaware's Corporation Code has been characterized as leading a "race
to the bottom,"2 whereas the Illinois Business Corporation Act ("BCA")
was the model for the original Model Business Corporation Act3 and
generally is regarded as a balanced statute, containing many protections
for shareholders and minority interests.4 Similarly, as discussed below,
* Charles W. Murdock is a Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago School of Law
where he served formerly as Dean. He drafted the 1983 Illinois Business Corporation Act and
served on the Committee that drafted the Illinois modifications to the Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act. He is the author of a two volume treatise on business organizations.
1. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 670 (1974).
2. See id. at 664-65. For a succinct summary of the "race to the bottom" argument, see
MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-CASES AND
MATERIALS 102-07 (4th ed. 2000). Eisenberg suggests that Delaware may be moderating its
pro-management stance because it has not been as aggressive as other states in adopting anti-
takeover statutes. Id. at 106. However, there may be other explanations for this. Consider, for
example, Delaware's failure to adopt a control share statute. The reason for this could be that
Delaware could not meet the standing test upon which the Supreme Court, in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, in part relied upon to uphold Indiana's control share statute. See
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987). Indiana's statute applies only to
corporations that have their principal offices in Indiana and where either 10% of the corporation's
shareholders reside in Indiana, 10% of the corporation's shares are owned by Indiana residents, or
10,000 shareholders of the corporation reside in Indiana. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a) (West
1989). In upholding the Indiana statute, the Supreme Court stated that "the Indiana Act applies
only to corporations that have a substantial number of shareholders in Indiana." CTS Corp., 481
U.S. at 93. Many corporations organized in Delaware do not have their shareholder base in
Delaware.
3. See Ray Garrett, Model Business Corporation Act, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 412, 424 (1952).
4. See 7 CHARLES W. MURDOCK, ILLINOIS PRACTICE-BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 1.12
(1996); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.40(a), 7.55, 7.71, 7.85, 8.35, 8.60, 11.65, 12.55, 12.56
(2002). Delaware generally has no comparable provisions or, if it does, such provisions are
inferior. For example, Illinois provides dissenters' rights in both mergers and sales of
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Illinois courts generally have been protective of minority shareholders'
interests. 5
Consequently, it is paradoxical that the Illinois courts, although
divided on the issue, frequently have accepted the imposition of
minority and marketability (liquidity) discounts in "fair value"
proceedings. 6  The legislature has offered protection to minority
shareholders under a "fair value" standard in two circumstances: (1)
dissenters' rights under sections 11.65 and 11.70 of the BCA 7 and (2)
alternative remedies, generally in oppression situations, under section
12.56 of the BCA.8 These sections frequently are triggered when the
person or persons in control of a corporation use their power to
disadvantage minority shareholder interests.
This Article will first examine the types of situations that give rise to
fair value proceedings-cash-out mergers, reverse stock splits, and
oppressive conduct-to illustrate the conflicts of interest between those
in control and minority shareholders. 9 It will then review the Illinois
cases that hold those in control to a high standard of fiduciary duty and
contrast this approach with the effect of discounts in fair value cases,
noting that the courts did not recognize the fiduciary issues involved in
any of the cases accepting discounts. 10 The Article will then summarize
substantially all the assets of the corporation, whereas Delaware grants the rights only in mergers.
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2002), with 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11.65. In another
area, Delaware's conflict of interest statute, title 8, section 144 of the Delaware Code, on its face
would permit an interested shareholder to insulate herself from self-dealing activity as a director.
Fortunately, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del.
1976), in effect rewrote the Delaware statute to make it comparable to section 8.60 of the Illinois
Business Corporation Act.
5. See infra Part III.B (discussing Illinois Supreme Court decisions that establish the existence
of the majority shareholder and director's fiduciary duty to the corporation and to minority
shareholders).
6. See infra Part Il.C (discussing the evolution of Illinois case law concerning discounts). A
minority discount is a reduction in the value of shares because the shares are held by a minority
shareholder who does not control the corporation. A marketability discount is a reduction in the
value of shares because there is not a ready market into which the shares can be sold.
The impact of applying discounts in valuing shares of stock is discussed infra Part IV.A.I.
A "fair value" proceeding is one in which the value of a shareholder's interest in a corporation is
determined by a court pursuant to legislative direction. See infra notes 7-8 and accompanying
text.
7. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11.65, 11.70 (articulating the shareholder's right to dissent in
section 11.65 and the proper procedure for dissenting in section 11.70).
8. Id. § 12.56 (discussing minority shareholder remedies in situations involving, inter alia,
oppressive conduct by those in control of a corporation).
9. See infra Part II.A (discussing the mechanics of cash-out mergers and Illinois statutory
provisions establishing dissenters' rights to fair value determinations of their shares).
10. See infra Part nIB-C (discussing Illinois cases regarding the application of a majority
shareholder's or director's fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder and the corporation).
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the policy arguments against discounts and demonstrate that discounts
transfer value from the minority to the majority, thereby rewarding
those in control who are not faithful to their fiduciary obligation not to
benefit at the expense of the corporation or the other shareholders. 1 It
concludes by reviewing the decisions in other jurisdictions that
demonstrate conclusively that the Illinois position is inconsistent with
the overall trend of these decisions. 12
II. BACKGROUND
The transactions that give rise to "fair value" proceedings-generally
cash-out mergers, reverse stock splits, and oppressive conduct-often
involve complex fact situations and invariably implicate conflicts of
interests. Accordingly, each of these situations will be analyzed in
terms of both the applicable statutes and the conflicts of interest that are
inherent in these situations.
A. Cash-out Mergers
The BCA now permits cash to be used as the consideration given to
the shareholders of a merging corporationl 3-that is, a corporation that
merges into another corporation and whose separate existence then
ceases. 14 In such a cash-out merger, section 11.70 of the BCA gives
dissenters' rights to shareholders who are squeezed out.
15
The mechanics of a cash-out merger, using figure 1 below as an
example, are as follows: Those in control set up a "vehicle" corporation
("Vehicle, Inc.") that they control and into which the operating
corporation ("Business, Inc.") will merge. Cash is used as the
consideration, with the result being that minority shareholder C's
interest in Business, Inc. is extinguished. While all former owners of
Business, Inc. receive cash for their interests in Business, Inc., which
will cease to exist after the merger, the shareholders who controlled
11. See infra Part 1V.B (examining the current judicial trend rejecting both minority and
liquidity discounts).
12. See infra Part IV.B (noting the numerous jurisdictions that have rejected minority and
marketability (liquidity) discounts compared to the few jurisdictions besides Illinois that continue
to apply minority and marketability discounts); infra app., tbls. 1-4 (listing states that have
accepted or rejected discounts); see, e.g., Offenbecher v. Baron Servs., Inc., No. 2000025, 2002
WL 959833, at *4 (Ala. Civ. App. May 10, 2002) ("The majority rule applied in the several
United States jurisdictions with respect to the calculation of "fair value" under the [Model
Business Corporation Act] does not allow any discounting .... "), affd sub nom. Ex parte Baron
Servs., Inc., No. 1011635, 2003 WL 1787932 (Ala. 2003).
13. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11.05(c).
14. See id. § 11.50(a)(2).
15. See id. § 11.70.
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Business, Inc., A and B, now control Vehicle, Inc., which has acquired
all the assets and liabilities of Business, Inc. by operation of law. 16
Vehicle, Inc. now has the business of the initial corporation and
minority shareholder C is out in the cold because he has no equity
interest in Vehicle, Inc. In essence, Vehicle, Inc. is now Business, Inc.
but C has no ownership interest.
Business, Inc. IMerge Vehicle, Inc.
A B C oA3C-
$ $ $ Cash
Figure 1. Diagram of a cash-out merger.
This is, in essence, a form of private eminent domain because
Vehicle, Inc. has acquired C's stock over his objection. All that is
necessary to authorize a merger in Illinois is majority action at the board
of directors level17 and a two-thirds vote at the shareholder level. 18
Assuming A, B, and C comprise a three-person board of directors, and
assuming each owns one-third of the shares, A and B constitute a
majority of the board and, at the shareholder level, can provide the
requisite two-thirds vote to accomplish the merger.
The foregoing is sometimes referred to as "cram-down." By
following statutory procedures, those in control of a corporation can
''cram" a transaction "down" the throat of the minority over the
minority's objection. Thus, the minority is forced to accept cash for the
stock previously owned, even though the minority opposes the
transaction. In figure 1 above, Vehicle, Inc. is a "clone" of Business,
16. See id. § 11.50(a)(3)-(a)(5).
17. Id. § 11.05 ("The board of directors of each corporation shall, by resolution adopted by a
majority vote of the members of each board, approve a plan merger .... ").
18. Id. § 11.20(a). The two-thirds vote can be reduced to a majority vote through a prior
amendment of the articles of incorporation. Id. § 11.20(b). But such amendment would itself
require a two-thirds vote. Id. § 10.20(c)-(d).
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Inc. The only difference is in ownership. All three shareholders owned
Business, Inc. but only A and B own Vehicle, Inc.
In this situation, there is no "structural" assurance of fairness because
A and B are on both sides of the transaction and thus have a conflict of
interest. A and B could care less whether the cash given in the
transaction is adequate, i.e., fair, because through their ownership of
Vehicle, Inc., they end up owning the business and the assets of
Business, Inc. In fact, the smaller the cash consideration Vehicle, Inc.
gives in the transaction to the shareholders of Business, Inc., the less
cash A and B will need to front temporarily through Vehicle, Inc., which
will then give two-thirds of the cash back to A and B in their capacity as
shareholders of Business, Inc. pursuant to the merger. The person who
comes out on the short end is C, who has received inadequate
consideration for his stock in Business, Inc.
Because those in control have the power to eliminate minority
shareholders on the majority's terms, the Illinois legislature has
provided "dissenters"' or "appraisal" rights for shareholders in C's
situation. Pursuant to sections 11.65 and 11.70 of the Business
Corporation Act,19 C can request that the court determine the "fair
value" of his shares. It is important to note that the "standard of value"
is not "fair market value" but rather "fair value." As will be discussed
below, legislatures throughout the United States have almost uniformly
used "fair value" as the standard in these statutes 20 rather than a fair
market value methodology, which traditionally has employed minority
and marketability discounts. 21
To appreciate the relationship between the "private eminent domain"
nature of squeeze-out transactions and the "fair value" standard, it is
important to recognize that, in the early development of the corporate
enterprise, squeeze-out mergers would have been impossible because
organic changes required a unanimous vote.22 This afforded protection,
19. Id. §§ 11.65, 11.70.
20. Pueblo Bancorp. v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 364-65 (Colo. 2003) ("[Florty-five
states... currently have dissenters' rights statutes which, like Colorado, require that a dissenting
shareholder be paid 'fair value' for his shares.").
21. See Charles Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and
Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 479-80 (1990)
(analyzing why the fair market value approach, which discounts the value of stock in federal tax
cases, protects the taxpayer-shareholder but disadvantages shareholders in a corporate squeeze-
out, thus justifying the adoption of another standard of value, "fair value," in squeeze-out and
freeze-out situations).
22. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 504 (7th Cir.
1989) ("Corporate law once had a generally-applicable unanimity rule in major transactions .... "
(citing William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and
2004]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
but also too much power, to the minority. The Illinois Supreme Court,
in Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., explained the change from a
unanimous vote requirement to a two-thirds vote requirement, with the
concurrent creation of dissenters' rights, as follows:
At common law the unanimous consent of the stockholders of a
corporation was required to make fundamental changes in the
corporation. To provide needed flexibility and to remove what was in
effect a power of veto held by a dissenting minority, legislatures
authorized the making of corporate changes by majority vote. To
afford a measure of protection to a dissenting minority, most
jurisdictions, including Illinois, enacted statutes giving dissenters the
right to receive the cash value of their stock and providing for an
appraisal of the stock where an agreement as to its value could not be
reached.23
Thus, the legislative quid pro quo for minority shareholders' sacrifice
of their veto power was the right to receive, in cash, the judicially
determined "fair value" of their shares. As the United States Supreme
Court stated, the change from a unanimous vote to a majority vote
"opened the door to victimization of the minority." 24 To solve this
dilemma, many state legislatures adopted statutes permitting a
dissenting minority shareholder to recover the appraised value of its
shares. In Iowa, for example, the state supreme court opined that an
Iowa statute "allow[ed] a dissenting minority to get out of the
corporation with the 'real value' of its stock. It prevented the minority
from being squeezed out for a lesser price." 25 Since the purpose of the
statute is to protect minority shareholders, it is inconsistent with the
purpose of the statute to advantage the majority and disadvantage the
minority by transferring value from the minority to the majority through
the discounting process. 26
Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69, 77-97; Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's
Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 226-30 (1962))).
23. Teschner v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 322 N.E.2d 54, 56 (Ill. 1975) (citations omitted).
24. Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 536 n.6 (1941).
25. Woodward v. Quigley, 133 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Iowa 1965). The Iowa Supreme Court later
opined that minority discounts are precluded under either the "real value" or "fair value"
standard. Sec. State Bank v. Zeigeldorf, 554 N.W.2d 884, 889-90 (Iowa 1996) (holding that
applying marketability discounts only to minority blocks of stock undermines legislative intent to
protect minority shareholders).
26. See infra Part IV.A.1 (examining how value is transferred from minority shareholders to
the controlling shareholders as a result of discounting).
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B. Reverse Stock Splits
The effect of a cash-out merger can be accomplished in a simpler
fashion through a reverse stock split27 if the minority shareholder whose
removal is sought holds less than the number of shares held by those in
control. For example, if A and B were each to hold thirty-four shares
and C held thirty-two shares, A and B, through their control of the board
and two-thirds shareholder voting control, could amend the articles of
incorporation to provide for a one-for-thirty-four stock split-i.e., for
every thirty-four shares held, a shareholder would be entitled to one
share.
A normal stock split, say, for example, two-for-one, is used to
increase the number of shares outstanding and thus lower the price of
the shares. In a two-for-one split, each shareholder would receive two
shares for each share previously held, but the price of the new shares
would be only one-half of the pre-split share price because the value of
the corporation has not changed.
In a reverse stock split, the goal is not just to decrease the number of
shares outstanding, but to create fractional shares and reduce not only
the number of shares outstanding but also the number of shareholders.28
In the example above, A and B would each receive one share, but C
would be entitled only to a fraction (32/34) of one share. In such a
situation, the recapitalization plan would normally provide that
fractional shares not be issued but rather paid for in cash. Thus, C
would again be "cashed out" over his objection.
Illinois' fractional-share statute29 neither uses the term "fair value"
nor gives the cashed-out shareholder dissenters' rights. However, in an
attempt not to run afoul of the fairness condition implicit in Teschner,
thus enabling the shareholder to enjoin the transaction, the company, in
most reverse stock split situations, utilizes the optional dissenters' rights
27. The Illinois Supreme Court, in Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., approved a reverse
stock split but noted that
[t]he plaintiff's complaint made no claim of fraud or deceptive conduct by the
defendants. It did not charge that the exchange offer was unfair or that the price later
offered for the shares was inadequate .... The plaintiff did not allege or show any
improper purpose on the part of the defendants.
Teschner, 322 N.E.2d at 57-58.
28. Pursuant to Illinois law, the board of directors, in lieu of issuing fractional shares, has the
option to pay cash equal to the value of each fractional share, thereby cashing out minority
shareholders. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6.15 (2002).
29. Id.
2004]
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provision in the BCA. 30 It is through this means that "fair value" issues
arise in reverse stock splits.
C. Freeze-outs and Oppression
The foregoing transactions are frequently referred to as "squeeze-
outs" because the minority shareholder is squeezed out, i.e., removed
from the corporation against his will. However, those in control of a
corporation sometimes employ another technique, referred to as a
"freeze-out," to rid themselves of minority shareholders. This technique
frequently involves terminating the minority shareholder as an
employee and stopping the payment of dividends. It is arguably more
pernicious than a squeeze-out because the minority shareholder still has
funds invested in the corporation but has no return on such investment,
either through salary or dividends.
Consider the following situation: A, B, and C each invest $85,000 in a
corporation, which, after a time, earns $500,000 annually before
payment of salaries to A, B, and C. Assume further that the market
would value the jobs done by A, B, and C at $100,000 each, but A, B,
and C instead determine to pay themselves a salary of $150,000 each.
Since they are the only shareholders, no one but the Internal Revenue
Service would complain about the reasonableness of such salaries and,
if the corporation is a Subchapter S corporation, even the IRS won't
care!31
Business valuation experts would characterize $50,000 of the
$150,000 salary as "non-functional" compensation. 32 In effect, it is a
30. Id. § 11.65(a)(4) (allowing minority dissent and consideration in accordance with section
11.70 or as provided in the by-laws or the articles of incorporation).
31. In a "C" corporation, the corporation is a tax paying entity. Consequently, taxpayers have
sought to reduce corporate income by taking out profits in the form of compensation, which is
deductible by the corporation. However, an "S" corporation is a "pass through" entity and the
corporation pays no tax at the entity level, though there are, however, modest "reasonable
compensation" issues in an S corporation relating to whether the shareholders are subject to self-
employment tax.
32. See, e.g., Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1327-28 (D.S.C. 1987) (treating $150,000
of a $250,000 salary as non-functional). One valuation expert explained non-functional
compensation as follows:
In closely-held companies, it is common to find that compensation and perquisites
to owners and managers may be based on the personal desires of owners and on the
company's ability to pay rather than on the value of services performed for the
company. How much the earning power base should be adjusted to reflect
discrepancies between compensation paid and value of service performed depends on
the purpose of the valuation.
Owners of successful closely-held businesses tend to take out what normally would
be considered profits in the form of compensation and discretionary expenses. This
may be an effort to avoid the double taxation that arises from paying a corporate
[Vol. 35
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dividend or a return on the capital invested in the corporation.33 Yet,
what if A and B, as two of the three directors, voted to terminate C? C
is now without a job and has no return on the capital he invested in the
corporation. In other words, A and B have "frozen out" C.
Frequently, A and B, after freezing out C by terminating his
employment, will then raise their own salaries. In the above example, A
and B could raise their salaries by $75,000 each without affecting the
"after salary" profits of the corporation. In effect, they are dividing C's
former salary between themselves. 34  Even if they do not do this, they
are, in effect, giving themselves a $50,000 dividend (the non-functional
portion of their $150,000 salary), but denying any return to C. This is a
conflict of interest situation because A and B are distributing corporate
funds to themselves but not to C.35
Courts, in reviewing the foregoing situation, frequently have
concluded that C's "reasonable expectations" have been frustrated and
that the conduct of A and B is "oppressive" toward C.3 6 The Illinois
legislature, in situations involving oppressive conduct, has provided C
income tax and then paying a personal income tax on what is left from that paid in the
form of dividends. It is not uncommon to find an owner/manager of a successful
company drawing $150,000 annual compensation, even though his services to the
company could be replaced for $60,000 per year. The extreme cases go much, much
farther.
If the owner/manager described in the previous paragraph wants to sell his business
and retire, the difference between his compensation and what it will cost to replace him
will become available as a part of pretax profits, and the earning power base should be
adjusted accordingly in establishing the selling price of the business.
SHANNON P. PRATr, VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD
COMPANIES 172-73 (1981).
33. One of the first courts to recognize the plight of the minority shareholder was the court in
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Mass. 1975). "[The
majority] may drain off the corporation's earnings in the form of exorbitant salaries and bonuses
to the majority shareholder officers and perhaps to their relatives... Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at
513 (citing F.H. O'NEAL & J. DENSEN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATE 42
(1961)); see also In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (N.Y. 1984) (noting that
Kemp & Beatley had a long-standing policy of awarding de facto dividends based in stock
ownership in the form of extra compensation bonuses).
34. The net effect is that A and B each receive $225,000 (their initial salary of $150,000 plus
$75,000-one half of what C formerly received). Since the value of each of their jobs is only
$100,000, each receives a disguised dividend of $125,000 while C receives nothing.
35. See In re Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d at 1180.
36. Id. at 1179; see also Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, What Amounts to Oppressive
Conduct Under Statute Authorizing Dissolution of Corporation at Suit of Minority Stockholder,
56 A.L.R. 3d 358 (1974). See generally 8 MURDOCK, supra note 4, at §§ 18.19-18.20 (reviewing
the development and application of the reasonable expectations test in situations involving
oppressive conduct).
2004]
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with a panoply of remedies, including the right to be bought out at "fair
value." 37
III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF ILLINOIS LAW
A. "Fair Value "-A Question of Fact or a Matter of Law
The foregoing discussion illustrates the types of situations that can
give rise to "fair value" determinations. The balance of this Article
focuses upon the appropriate approach for Illinois courts to take when
confronting the issue of whether to accept minority or liquidity
discounts in determining the value of minority shares in fair value
proceedings. The overwhelming majority of courts throughout the
country have held that neither liquidity nor minority discounts are
permissible in fair value proceedings. 38
Generally, courts have held that the inappropriateness of discounts is
a question of law and not of fact.39 By contrast, Illinois courts have
treated the issue as one of fact, in which the trial court defers to the
valuation expert and the appellate court defers to the trial court.4 °
This is indeed a paradoxical situation since most valuation experts
with whom the author has worked acknowledge that they rely upon the
advice of the attorney who engaged them as to whether to incorporate
minority and liquidity discounts into their valuation approach. The
author's experience is confirmed by the advice offered by three of the
leading valuation experts in their current treatise: "[Tihe appraiser
should solicit the view of counsel as to interpretation of fair value and,
in most cases, should not assume that there is a definition that is clear
and concise." 41
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that there is a clear and
concise definition of "fair value" of a shareholder's interest, namely, the
proportionate interest of the minority shareholder in the enterprise as a
37. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)( 11), 12.56(e)-(t) (2002) (governing the purchase of all
of a petitioning shareholder's shares by the corporation or by other shareholders).
38. See infra notes 132-48 and accompanying text (revealing that most states that confront the
issue of minority and marketability discounts reject the use of those discounts); infra app., tbls. 1-
2 (listing jurisdictions where courts have rejected minority and liquidity discounts).
39. Note the language quoted from the cases listed in tables 1 and 2 of the appendix: when a
court holds that discounts are impermissible, the court treats the issue as one of law.
40. See, e.g., Stanton v. Republic Bank of S. Chi., 581 N.E.2d 678, 681 (Il. 1991). The lower
court stated that the case was "essentially an 'expert witness... type of case,"' and the Illinois
Supreme Court stated that it, "as the reviewing court, will not substitute the judgment as to
credibility of witnesses for that of the trial court." Id.
41. SHANNON P. PRAT-r ET AL., VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF
CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 32 (4th ed. 2000).
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whole, valued on a going-concern basis, without applying either a
minority or a marketability discount. 42 Unfortunately, in Illinois, we
have the nonsensical situation with respect to discounts in which the
appellate courts defer to the trial courts; the trial courts, in effect, defer
to the valuation expert; and the valuation expert defers to the opinion of
the attorney who engaged the expert. Contrariwise, most other
jurisdictions 43 regard minority and liquidity discounts as prohibited as a
matter of law.
B. The Illinois Supreme Court and Fiduciary Duties
Before analyzing the economics of discounts, the rationale for not
utilizing them in fair value proceedings, and the opinions from other
jurisdictions, it is important to review the teaching of the Illinois
Supreme Court with respect to fiduciary duties and minority shareholder
rights. As stated at the outset of this Article, Illinois is sometimes
viewed as pro-shareholder, as opposed to pro-management. 44 A better
characterization of Illinois jurisprudence is that it is balanced and in
tune with reality, as opposed to the pro-management bias that
sometimes characterizes Delaware decisions.
Several decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court establish that
directors and controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its shareholders and reflect a concern that those in
control do not advantage themselves at the expense of other
shareholders. In Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co.,45 which
was an early and rudimentary version of a management leveraged buy-
out, the supreme court stated:
The question is one when, as between the parties, influence is implied
in the very conception of the relation, in which the position of one is
superior to that of the other. It does not involve intentional
concealment or misrepresentation, and while equity does not deny the
possibility of valid transactions between the two parties, yet, because
every fiduciary relation implies a condition of superiority held by one
of the parties over the other, in every transaction between them by
which the superior party obtains a possible benefit, equity raises a
presumption against its validity, and casts upon that party the burden
42. See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989); see also infra app.,
this. 1-2 (listing the cases that have endorsed this definition).
43. See infra app., tbls. 1-4 (summarizing the cases that have addressed this issue).
44. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
45. Winger v. Chi. City Bank & Trust Co., 67 N.E.2d 265 (I11. 1946). A substantial portion of
the following discussion of Winger is excerpted from the author's treatise on business
organizations. See 8 MURDOCK, supra note 4, § 14.2, at 5-6.
2004]
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of proving affirmatively its compliance with equitable requisites to
overcome the presumption.
46
The foregoing statement catches the essence of the basis upon which
a fiduciary relationship depends: the imbalance of power between the
fiduciary and the one to whom a duty is owed. In the corporate form,
while the shareholders ostensibly control the directors through the
electoral process, once the directors are in place, they control not only
the operations of the corporation but also the flow of information back
to the shareholders. As the Winger court observed, "if the directors act
in their own interests there was no one to represent the corporation" 47
or, of course, its shareholders-or at least those shareholders who are
not coextensive with the directors. Thus, it is the power and control that
directors have vis-A-vis the corporation and its shareholders that gives
rise to the fiduciary duties imposed upon a director.
Likewise, a review of Illinois decisions illustrates that Illinois courts
also have been vigilant in protecting the interests of minority
shareholders. Consider the decision in Tilley v. Shippee,4 8 which is
significant not only for its holding but also for its economic analysis of
the situation. In Tilley, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a
contract to purchase a business, including its real estate, name, and
other property for $60,000. 4 9 The property, aside from real estate, was
worth about $3000.50
The transaction was closed at a bank that loaned the defendant
$30,000 secured by the real estate. 51 These funds were paid to the
sellers; in addition, the plaintiff paid the sellers $10,000, and the
defendant paid them $20,000.52 The business was incorporated, and the
plaintiff received one-third of the shares and the defendant, two-thirds.53
The corporate minutes indicated that the defendant leased the real estate
to the corporation, which had an option to buy after six months. 54
However, the business failed, and the defendant canceled the lease for
non-payment of rent.55 When the plaintiff learned that the defendant
46. id. at 276 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Tilley v. Shippee, 147 N.E.2d 347 (I11. 1958). A substantial portion of the following
discussion of Tilley is excerpted from the author's treatise on business organizations. See 7
MURDOCK, supra note 4, § 10.4, at 572.
49. Id. at 349.
50. Id. at 348.
51. Id. at 349.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 349-50.
54. Id. at 350.
55. Id.
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claimed outright ownership of the real estate, he filed suit to declare a
constructive trust on the real estate. 56
In analyzing the parties' business relationship, the court found it
improbable that the plaintiff would have paid $10,000 for a one-third
interest in the non-real estate assets worth $3000. 57 On the other hand,
viewing the transaction as a whole, the plaintiff paid one-third of the
cash, the defendant paid two-thirds, and the rental payments by the
corporation, which was owned in a one-third to two-thirds ratio, were
intended to pay off the debt on the real estate.58 This data indicated that
the plaintiff had a one-third interest in all the purchased property. 59 The
court held:
In this particular transaction the parties were joint adventurers in the
acquisition of a business which was being purchased for operation by
them. Their decision to form and operate as a corporation rather than
a partnership does not change the fact that they were embarking on a
joint enterprise, and their mutual duties and obligations were similar to
those of partners. 60
Accordingly, the court imposed a constructive trust upon the real
estate and required the plaintiff to assume one-third of the mortgage
liability.
Two years later, the Illinois Supreme Court in Shlensky v. South
Parkway Building Corp.61 clarified that Winger did not hold that
directors could never deal with their corporation, but rather that "the
rule of the Winger case, insofar as it provides that directors shall have
the burden of establishing the fairness and propriety of the transactions,
not only protects shareholders from exploitation, but permits flexibility
in corporate dealings." 62 This would not be the case if directors were
absolutely barred from engaging in transactions with their corporations.
On the other hand, placing the burden of proof on the persons
challenging the actions of a fiduciary "would put a premium on sharp
practices by directors by putting the onus of proof on their victims, and
would also tend to further separate corporate management from
56. Id.
57. Id. at 352.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Shlensky v. S. Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793 (I11. 1960). A substantial portion of
the following discussion of Shlensky is excerpted from the author's treatise on business
organizations. See 8 MURDOCK, supra note 4, § 14.2, at 6.
62. Id. at 801.
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ownership." 63 Accordingly, the court placed the burden of proof on the
defendant directors.
Consequently, it is clear under Illinois case law that, in conflict of
interest situations, the defendant directors, or the controlling
shareholders, as the case may be, have the burden of proving the
fairness of the transaction. In conflict of interest situations, the
immediate harm is to the corporation, but minority shareholders also are
affected adversely. For example, in the merger situation discussed
earlier, all shareholders are affected adversely by the inadequate
consideration in the merger.64 Yet, the real loss only falls on the
minority shareholder because the majority shareholders receive a more
than offsetting benefit from their position on the other side of the
transaction.
Later, in Kerrigan v. Unity Savings Ass'n, five individuals, three of
whom were also directors, controlled a savings and loan association;
these individuals then organized an insurance agency to sell insurance
to mortgage customers of the association. 65  On the basis of the
pleadings, the court determined that the formation of the insurance
agency was a corporate opportunity that the defendants appropriated
without first offering it to the association.66 The court remanded the
case to the trial court, which had granted summary judgment for the
defendants and stated strongly that "in the view that we take of this
case, the question of defendants' liability is established on the basis of
the pleadings and no trial is required.' 67 According to the supreme
court, "[s]ince the individual defendants, as directors, admittedly
controlled Unity [Savings], the requisite disclosure and tender would
necessarily have had to be made to Unity's shareholders." 68 Thus, those
in control owed a duty to the minority shareholders.
These cases, and the numerous appellate court decisions that have
followed them,69 demonstrate that Illinois jurisprudence requires those
in control of a corporation to act in the best interests of the corporation
and all of its shareholders. In addition, when those in control deal with
63. Id.
64. See supra fig. I (diagramming the mechanics of a cash-out merger).
65. Kerrigan v. Unity Say. Ass'n, 317 N.E.2d 39, 41 (111. 1974). A substantial portion of the
following discussion of Kerrigan is excerpted from the author's treatise on business
organizations. See 8 MURDOCK, supra note 4, § 14.2, at 7.
66. Id. at 44.
67. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 43.
69. See 7 MURDOCK, supra note 4, §10.4 (examining cases addressing shareholder fiduciary
duties); 8 id. ch. 14 (collecting cases involving duty of loyalty issues).
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the corporation, they have the burden of establishing the fairness of the
transaction.
C. The Current Illinois Position on Minority Discounts
There are four appellate decisions and one Illinois Supreme Court
decision dealing explicitly with the issue of whether minority or
liquidity discounts are appropriate in fair value determinations. While
the supreme court decision represents the controlling law, its decision in
Stanton v. Republic Bank of South Chicago70 can be understood best by
first reviewing the earlier appellate court decisions.
The first case, Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine,71 is unsound
precedent for several reasons, the most substantial of which is the fact
that it was predicated upon an erroneous view of the approach taken in
other jurisdictions regarding discounts. In support of either minority or
liquidity discounts, the court in Independence Tube cited decisions from
Georgia 72 (which now has been overruled by the Georgia Supreme
Court), Kentucky, 73 and New York.74 What the court did not recognize
was that, at that point in time, courts in five jurisdictions had rejected
discounts-California, 75  Delaware,76  Indiana,77  Iowa,78  and
70. Stanton v. Republic Bank of S. Chi., 581 N.E.2d 678 (Ill. 1991).
71. Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine, 535 N.E.2d 927 (I11. App. Ct. 1st. Dist. 1988)
(finding that in a closely held corporation, the "minority interest factor" and the "lack of
marketability" are intrinsic factors to use for evaluation purposes even when the real buyer is the
corporation). See generally infra notes 72-89 and accompanying text (discussing Independence
Tube).
72. Atl. States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 314 S.E.2d 245, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that
minority discounts are allowable but must be applied with "caution"). The Beavers case,
however, has been overruled by Blitch v. Peoples Bank, 540 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
(rejecting both minority and liquidity discounts).
73. Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982)
(noting that a marketability discount "merely indicates that the appraisers gave some weight to
the market value of the stock").
74. Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 341 (App. Div. 1985). While Blake accepted
marketability discounts, it rejected minority discounts. Id. at 349.
75. Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 154 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176 (Ct. App. 1979). In
rejecting discounted minority share valuation, Brown also held that majority shareholders have a
fiduciary duty to the corporation not to undervalue stock. Id. at 177.
76. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Civ. A. Nos. 7959-60, 7967-68, 1988 WL 15816, at *8-*9
(Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1988) (rejecting discounted share valuation as contrary to statutory policy
because it calculates the overall value of shares as a function of specific shares), affd, 564 A.2d
1137 (Del. 1989).
77. Eyler v. Eyler, 492 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind. 1986) (rejecting, as part of a divorce
proceeding, the application of a minority discount to shares of a business attributable to a spouse).
78. Woodward v. Quigley, 133 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Iowa 1965) (finding that the statute allowed
"dissenting minority to get out.., with the 'real value' of its stock" and "prevented the minority
from being squeezed out for a lesser price").
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Missouri79-while a sixth jurisdiction-Kansas-noted that a
"minority" discount already was impounded in the valuation process
when it was predicated upon a capitalized earnings approach.8 ° This is
because price-earnings ratios are derived from publicly traded stocks
that represent minority interests. It is for this reason that some
Delaware courts add a control premium,8 1 as opposed to a minority
discount, in determining fair value.
Consequently, the decision in Independence Tube, rather than
reflecting the position taken in other jurisdictions, actually adopted a
minority position. As will be discussed below, today this minority
position is further dwarfed by the overwhelming number of jurisdictions
that have rejected discounts since Independence Tube was decided. 82
Independence Tube is also of dubious precedential value because the
minority shareholder in the case arguably was attempting to extort the
company. The purpose of the transaction in this case was to enable the
company to elect Subchapter S status. 83 The company offered $500 per
share to its shareholders, and the plaintiff shareholder voluntarily sold
400 shares 84 but refused to sell 100 shares held in trust.85 Because a
trust generally cannot be a shareholder of a Subchapter S corporation, 86
it was critical that the corporation acquire the 100 shares held in trust.
The shareholder claimed that these shares were worth between $774 and
$1405 per share. 87  The court found the value to be $550 per share,
which approximated what the company had offered per share and what
79. Dreiseszun v. FLM Indus., 577 S.W.2d 902, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that the
value of the plaintiffs shares must be computed "pro rata").
80. Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 630 P.2d 167, 177 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that
minority discounts were not appropriate when valuing a company on market value but acceptable
when the valuation was based on assets), overruled by Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank, 992
P.2d 216 (Kan. 1999). The Kansas Supreme Court subsequently held that "fair value" precludes
either a minority or marketability discount. Arnaud, 992 P.2d at 220. A capitalized earnings
value is the product of the earnings of a company and a price-earnings ratio. The price-earnings
ratio is derived from the trading prices of publicly held companies.
81. Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806-07 (Del. 1992) (discussing the valuation of
a subsidiary). A control premium is determined by comparing the market price of a company
with the price paid in a takeover. Acquiring companies typically pay a premium of 30-40% over
trading market prices.
82. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the jurisdictions that have rejected discounts); infra app.,
tbls. 1-2 (listing states where discounts have been rejected).
83. Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine, 535 N.E.2d 927, 928-29 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st. Dist.
1988).
84. Id. at 929.
85. Id.
86. I.R.C. § 1361 (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
87. Independence Tube, 535 N.E.2d at 929-30.
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the shareholder had accepted for 400 shares. 88 Thus, the court in effect
refused to let the plaintiff use his trustee status to extort more value than
he was willing to accept for the 400 shares he tendered to the
corporation.
While Independence Tube was the first "fair value" case to deal with
discounts, shortly before it was decided Johnston v. Hickory Creek
Nursery, Inc. rejected a minority discount where the interest was
purchased by the remaining shareholders, because the purchase, instead
of putting the buyers in a minority position, resulted in "a substantial
pro rata increase in their share and control of the corporation."8 9 This
same logic also dictates rejection of minority discounts in "fair value"
cases.
Two years after Independence Tube, the appellate court in
Institutional Equipment and Interiors, Inc. v. Hughes recognized that
"fair value" is a different standard of value than "fair market value,"
stating that "the trial court properly refused to use the fair-market value
approach, [which] did not apply in a situation where a dissenting
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation was being bought out
by a majority stockholder." 90 Consequently, the appellate court held
that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to apply either minority
or liquidity discounts. 91
The Institutional Equipment court defined the fair market value
standard as "based on the price that would be agreed upon in an arms-
length transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller on the
open market, neither under a compulsion to act, and both parties
possessed of all relevant facts." 92 This is the standard used in estate and
gift tax valuation. 93 As the author has discussed extensively in an
earlier article, the fair market value standard in tax cases typically
involves the use of both minority and liquidity discounts because the
"imposition of the tax mandates a cash out-flow-with the concomitant
requirement that at least some of the assets be converted into liquid
form." 94  Thus, in the tax area, the valuation approach should be
conservative; otherwise, the taxing process could become confiscatory
88. Id. at 931.
89. Johnston v. Hickory Creek Nursery, Inc., 521 N.E.2d 236, 239-40 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist.
1988).
90. Inst'l Equip. & Interiors, Inc. v. Hughes, 562 N.E.2d 662, 667-68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
1990).
91. Id. at 668.
92. Id. at 667.
93. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965).
94. Murdock, supra note 21, at 480.
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if the stock were sold at a lower price than that assessed by the Internal
Revenue Service.
It is with this background that the supreme court decision in Stanton
v. Republic Bank of South Chicago95 must be viewed. In Republic
Bank, appraisers for both parties employed discounts and the court
noted that "both discounts fell within the range proposed by the Bank's
experts and plaintiffs' experts." 96 This would not be surprising since, at
the time, fair value litigation had not exploded as it has during the past
decade.97  Consequently, a very substantial portion of a business
valuator's work was in connection with valuations for tax purposes,
where discounts are routine.98
Notwithstanding the fact that the appraisers and the trial court had
both employed discounts, the Illinois Supreme Court twice volunteered
that there was no requirement to use discounts in fair value proceedings,
stating that "the trial court acted within its discretion to apply such
discounts, even though not required to do so."99 After noting that the
minority and liquidity discounts only totaled 10% and were within the
range proposed by the experts, the court concluded that "the trial court
was not even required to apply any discounts." 1°° Thus, the supreme
court actually discouraged the use of discounts while, at the same time,
treating the issue as one of fact within the discretion of the trial court.
In 1997, in Weigel Broadcasting Company v. Smith, the appellate
court, while recognizing that "fair value" is not synonymous with "fair
market value,"10 1 declined to follow Institutional Equipment and
Hickory Creek because the cases were distinguishable factually from the
Weigel situation.10 2 In Weigel, Shapiro, the president of the company,
and his family owned 83% of the company before a reverse stock split,
and thus, according to the court, the shares the dissenting shareholders
95. Stanton v. Republic Bank of S. Chi., 581 N.E.2d 678 (Ill. 1991).
96., Id. at 682.
97. See infra app., tbls. 1-4. The overwhelming majority of cases are within the last ten years.
98. See, e.g., JEFF A. SCHNEPPER, THE PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS VALUATION
(1982). In his 1982 treatise, Schnepper devotes only fourteen out of 227 pages to valuation in
dissenters' rights cases and does not consider oppression cases at all, nor does he discuss the "fair
value" standard. See id. at 195-209. His focus is almost entirely on valuation for tax purposes.
By way of contrast, Shannon Pratt devoted two chapters to these issues in the 2000 edition of her
work. See PRATr ET AL., supra note 41, at 789-815.
99. Republic Bank, 581 N.E.2d at 682 (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. Weigel Broad. Co. v. Smith, 682 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1996).
102. Id. at 751.
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lost "did not materially increase Shapiro's control over, or position
within, the company."'10 3
In doing so, the court missed three fundamental points. First, the
primary rationale for minority and liquidity discounts is that a buyer
would not want to step into the shoes of the seller, a minority
shareholder, who is powerless to direct the operations of the company.
Thus, minority shares are worth less-the minority aspect-and are not
as saleable as control shares-the liquidity aspect. Yet, when the
corporation or a controlling shareholder is the buyer, the buyer is not
subject to the minority disability.
Second, eliminating minority shares is always to the advantage of
majority shareholders, assuming the majority can afford the buy-out. A
51% position is better than a 50% position, 1° 4 a 67% position is better
than a 51% position, 10 5 and a 100% position is better than an 83%
position. The main reason for this latter proposition is that a 100%
position frees the majority of conflict of interest issues and the attendant
possibility of a derivative suit, and it gives the majority shareholders
unfettered control of the corporation and access to corporate assets. 106
The cases are legion where those in control advantage themselves with
exorbitant salaries and loans, and by hiring family members and using
corporate funds for personal purposes. 107
The third fundamental point missed by the Weigel court is that the
imposition of discounts in valuing minority shares results in a transfer
of value from the minority shareholders to the majority shareholders.
103. Id.
104. A 50/50 split gives each shareholder veto power and can lead to deadlock.
105. For example, the BCA generally requires a two-thirds vote for organic changes. 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/10.20(c), 11.20(a), 11.60(c), 12.15(c) (2002).
106. See, e.g., Weinberger v. U.O.P., Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 708 (Del. 1983) (listing factors in
favor of a parent corporation merging a subsidiary into the parent, including "[flacilitat[ing] the
flow of resources between Signal [parent] and its subsidiaries" and "[e]liminat[ing] potential
conflicts of interest").
107. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Mass. 1975) (involving a
corporation which had agreed to buy out the controlling shareholder but not a minority
shareholder); see also Hager-Freeman v. Spircoff, 593 N.E.2d 821, 829 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1992) (discussing how the defendant hired his son as a director, apparently replacing the plaintiff,
and paid the son $10,000 per year even though the son was a full-time student downstate at
Southern Illinois University); Conduti v. Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d 220, 228 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1984) (discussing how bonuses were paid to the shareholder's children and family members when
they charged gasoline to the corporation), overruled by Schrimer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171
(1996); Miller v. Magline, 256 N.W.2d 761, 764 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (detailing how, in six
years, the defendant-president raised his salary from $10,016 to $120,183, an increase of over
1000%).
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This is essentially a conflict of interest situation that will be analyzed in
Part IV.A. 1 of this Article.
The Weigel court also cited Republic Bank for the proposition that the
imposition of discounts is within the discretion of the trial court, 10 8 and
cited this author for a dissenting point of view. 109 It is the opinion of
this author, which is supported in judicial decisions across the country,
that discounts are not a question of fact for the trial court but are barred
as a matter of law by the legislature's use of the standard "fair value."
The error that the supreme court made in Republic Bank was that it
did not recognize "fair value" as a standard of value but rather treated
this term as part of the factual valuation process. This is understandable
since judges themselves are not valuation experts. Moreover, at the
time Republic Bank was decided, more than a decade ago, most
business valuators did not understand that "fair value" is a different
standard than "fair market value." This is understandable because
legislative terms are for the legislatures and courts to define, not
laymen-and regarding legislative interpretation, business valuators are
laymen. As discussed earlier, business valuators generally rely upon the
attorney who engaged them to define what is meant by fair value. 10
As discussed below, courts around the country, and particularly in the
last decade or so, almost uniformly have held that, with respect to
minority and liquidity discounts, the "fair value" standard, as a matter of
law, prohibits such discounts. I l l Moreover, the business valuation
profession now is coming to appreciate the significance of the "fair
value" standard. In one of the most recent treatises on business
valuation, the significance of the fair value standard is addressed:
A clear and concise understanding of the appropriate standard of value
is a key to any credible business appraisal. Indeed, as Pratt, Reilly,
and Schweihs have indicated, the failure to adhere to the appropriate
standard of value can be a primary reason for the wide variances
between two business valuations. Nowhere is this principle more
significant than in the application of the fair value standard in
connection with oppressed and dissenting shareholder matters. 112
108. Weigel Broad. Co. v. Smith, 682 N.E.2d 745, 750 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1996).
109. Id. at 751.
110. See PRATrETAL., supra note 41, at 32.
Ill. See infra Part IV.B (explaining judicial trends rejecting the use of discounts in
calculating fair value).
112. Anne C. Singer & Jay E. Fishman, Fair Value for Oppressed and Dissenting
Shareholders, in HANDBOOK OF ADVANCED BUSINESS VALUATION 301 (Robert F. Reilly &
Robert P. Schweihs eds., 2000).
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The authors of this treatise acknowledge that, as legislatures rarely
define fair value, "the definition of fair value is left to judicial
interpretation." 13 It is noteworthy that these experts do not assert that
it is the role of business valuation experts to define fair value.
Before reviewing the case law and legislative developments, it may
be helpful first to analyze the economic impact of minority and liquidity
discounts, and the policy reasons for rejecting them in determining the
meaning of "fair value."
IV. ANALYSIS AS TO WHY DISCOUNTS SHOULD BE REJECTED IN ILLINOIS
A. The Policy Behind Rejecting Minority and Liquidity Discounts
1. Conflicts of Interest Transfer Value from the Minority
to the Majority
The transactions that give rise to "fair value" proceedings typically
involve direct or indirect conflicts of interest in which those in control
benefit at the expense of minority shareholders. Consider figure 1 at the
beginning of this Article, in which A and B organized Vehicle, Inc. and
caused the operating corporation, Business, Inc., to be merged into
Vehicle, Inc. This involves a clear conflict of interest since A and B,
through their control of both corporations, are on both sides of the deal.
In this situation, the payment of inadequate consideration by Vehicle,
Inc. to the shareholders of Business, Inc. injures C but benefits A and B
through their ownership of Vehicle, Inc. Accordingly, both the Illinois
Supreme Court decision in Shlensky 1 4 and section 8.60 of the BCA
l l5
impose upon A and B the burden of proving that the transaction was
fair. Thus, A and B must establish that "fair value" was given. Because
of the conflict of interest, however, it is impossible for A and B to
establish "fair value" when discounts are used in the valuation process.
Consider the following example, illustrated below, in which the value
of Business, Inc. before discounts is 100 units, 116 and such value is
reduced by a 30% minority discount and a 30% liquidity discount.
117
Since A and B each have 34% of the shares, their interest in the business
is sixty-eight units, while C's interest in the business is thirty-two units.
113. Id.
114. Shlensky v. S. Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793, 806 (I11. 1960).
115. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.60(a) (2002).
116. A unit could be either $1000 or $1 million. The percentage impact will be the same.
117. The combined effect of two 30% discounts is a 51% discount: 100 - 30% = 70;
70 - 30% = 49. Thus, the two discounts reduce C's value by 51%.
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Applying a 30% minority discount reduces this interest to 22.4;118
applying a liquidity discount of another 30% reduces the value of C's
interest to slightly less than sixteen units.] 19
Thus, the imposition of these discounts has reduced C's interest by
about 50%, or sixteen units. But where has this value gone?
Obviously, to A and B, because the "underlying" value of the business is
not affected by the change in ownership. Thus, the interest of A and B
has risen from sixty-eight units to eighty-four units, or about 25%.
When C is paid off, the value of Business, Inc. shrinks to eighty-four
units, of which A and B now own 100%, so their interest still has risen
from sixty-eight units to eighty-four units. Figure 2 below illustrates
what has happened.
Before Discounts After Discounts After C Eliminated
68 4-32 4-16
A C A C
& & 94 10 A&B
B 84--B
Business Value = 100 Business Value=100 Business Value=84
Figure 2. The effect of discounts on the interests of the minority and
majority shareholders in a transaction to eliminate the minority
shareholder.
Instead of using cash-out mergers, there is some tendency today to
use reverse stock splits to obfuscate the conflict of interest. In the
foregoing situation, since A and B each have more shares than C-
thirty-four, thirty-four, and thirty-two respectively-a one-for-thirty-
four reverse stock split, coupled with a decision not to issue fractional
shares, will eliminate C and give A and B each one share, or 50% of
Business, Inc. 120
Unlike a cash-out merger, the reverse stock split does not involve two
entities, each controlled by A and B, engaging in the transaction. A
cash-out merger is a two-step process: (1) organize Vehicle, Inc. and (2)
merge Business, Inc. into Vehicle, Inc. In contrast, a reverse stock split
118. 32.0-30%=22.4
119. 22.4-30%= 15.68.
120. A and B will each receive one share and C will receive 32/34 of a share. Since fractional
shares will not be issued, C will be paid in cash. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6.15; see also
supra Part II.B (discussing reverse stock splits).
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is a one-step approach: amend the articles of incorporation to reflect the
split and opt not to issue fractional shares. The essence is the same,
however, as A and B have used corporate machinery to eliminate C and
appropriate the remaining value of the business to themselves. Using
discounts to value C's interest results in a transfer of part of the value C
holds to A and B.
The oppression situation is slightly different. A review of the cases
on oppression illustrate that the conduct deemed oppressive also
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty-for example, firing an
employee-shareholder without legitimate cause. 121 Oppressive conduct
by those in control invariably involves benefiting the majority at the
expense of the minority. When this conduct leads to a buy-out,
discounting the value of minority shares leads to a double benefit to the
wrongdoer: the oppressive conduct in the first place and second, the
acquisition of the minority's interest cheaply.
2. Structural Reasons Why Discounts Are Inappropriate
From a structural standpoint, there are three reasons why discounts
are inappropriate in fair value cases. 122 As discussed above, both the
Hickory Creek and Institutional Equipment cases recognized that, when
the buyer is either a controlling shareholder or the corporation, the logic
that a minority interest is worth less because the buyer would assume
the impotent position of the seller simply is not true. 123 Contrariwise,
the minority shares acquired by either the corporation or the controlling
shareholder enhance the control of the controlling shareholder. 124 This
rebuts a major argument for a minority discount. Further, with respect
to a marketability or liquidity discount, it is paradoxical to argue
liquidity when the legislature has created an exit opportunity. As the
Illinois Supreme Court stated in Republic Bank:
121. See, e.g., In re Weidy's Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903--04 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985) (detailing the termination of an employee-shareholder without legitimate cause);
cf Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976) (holding that the
majority owners owed good faith and loyalty in their dealings with the minority owners).
122. For a more in depth exploration of these policy by the author, see Murdock, supra note
21, at 482-88.
123. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of the application
of minority discounts by the courts in Hickory Creek and Institutional Equipment).
124. For example, assume the shares of a 20% holder are acquired by the corporation. If there
were two 20% holders and one 60% holder, after the acquisition, only 80% of the formerly
outstanding shares remain outstanding, and the 60% holder now has 75% of the stock.
Obviously, if the 60% holder is the purchaser rather than the corporation, she now holds 80%. In
either event, the majority has increased its control.
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In conclusion, we note that the Bank and its majority shareholders are
the moving parties who caused the "merger" and brought themselves
within the statute. It was their choice. The minority and dissenting
shareholders then exercised their statutory right to have the court
decide fair value. Fair value does not necessarily mean that price
which the majority shareholders are willing to pay the minority
shareholders. 125
This same logic holds true for a reverse stock split or oppressive
conduct case. It is those in control whose conduct has triggered the
"fair value" proceeding that gives the minority shareholder the right to
sell his or her shares. In effect, the wrongful conduct creates a market
that previously did not exist.
The third policy reason against discounts from a structural
perspective is the pro-rata nature of the transactions that give rise to fair
value proceedings. In a merger, for example, all shares of the same
class are treated alike. A 51% holder does not receive a greater
consideration per share than a 1% holder. In the oppression situation,
the remedy initially provided by the legislature was dissolution.
126
Once again, in a corporate dissolution, a 51% holder does not receive
proportionately more per share than a 1% holder. The pro-rata nature of
the underlying transaction influenced the drafters of the Model Business
Corporation Act to amend the act in 1999 to reject discounts in fair
value proceedings. 127  As discussed in the following section, this
accelerated both statutory and case law developments rejecting minority
and liquidity discounts.
B. The Overwhelming Trend Since Independence Tube: Rejection of
Both Minority and Liquidity Discounts
As previously discussed, when Independence Tube accepted
discounts in fair value valuations, it was adopting a minority
position. 128 Moreover, of the three cases it relied upon, the Georgia
case has been overruled, with the Georgia Supreme Court now holding
that neither minority nor liquidity discounts are allowable in fair value
125. Stanton v. Republic Bank ofS. Chi., 581 N.E.2d 678, 682-83 (I11. 1991).
126. 1933 Business Corporation Act §86, 1933 I11. Laws 308, 351; see also Gidwitz v. Lanzit
Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 134 (Il. 1960) (finding that a court may liquidate a
corporation when those in control act oppressively).
127. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text (explaining that the court in Independence
Tube adopted a minority position as regards minority discounts).
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proceedings, 129 while the New York case accepted liquidity discounts
but explicitly rejected minority discounts. 130
In the decade and a half that has followed Independence Tube, the
case has become even more of a minority position. It appears that every
jurisdiction that has considered whether minority discounts are
allowable in fair value proceedings after Independence Tube in 1988,
twenty-five in all, have rejected minority discounts, generally as a
matter of law. 131 Accordingly there is no question but that the Illinois
cases, to the extent that they permit discounts based on the minority
status of the shareholder, in fair value proceedings, are an anomaly
when viewed from the perspective of judicial decisions across the
country.
With regard to marketability or illiquidity discounts, the Colorado
Supreme Court, in rejecting marketability discounts as a matter of law
earlier this year, surveyed all of the decisions relating to this issue that
had been brought to its attention and concluded that the "clear majority
trend" is not to apply such discounts. 132  According to the Colorado
court, the leading case is the Delaware case of Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Harnett,133 which fifteen other jurisdictions have followed. 134 Table 2
also lists four other jurisdictions, not addressed by the Colorado court,
that also have rejected marketability discounts: Arizona, Indiana, Iowa,
and North Carolina. 135 However, table 2 does not include Oklahoma
because a minority discount rather than a marketability discount was at
issue. 136 Nevertheless, the Oklahoma court did explicitly state that it
129. Blitch v. Peoples Bank, 540 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
130. Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
131. The states and years of rejection are as follows: Maine (1989); Rhode Island (1991);
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Washington (1992); Nebraska (1994); South Carolina
(1995); North Dakota, Vermont (1997); Montana (1998); Kansas, New Jersey, North Carolina
(1999); Georgia, Virginia, Wisconsin (2000); Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Missouri, South
Dakota (2001); Alabama, Indiana, Utah (2002); see also infra app., tbl. 1.
132. See Pueblo Bancorp. v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 367 (Colo. 2003) (deciding a dispute
in which this author testified as an expert witness during the trial court proceedings).
133. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144-45 (Del. 1989) (affirming a
chancery court decision that found that the application of marketability or minority discounts in
the valuation of minority stock was inappropriate). The corporation only appealed the refusal to
apply the minority discount. Id. at 1139, 1144.
134. Pueblo Bancorp., 63 P.3d at 365-66 (listing Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Maine,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Washington).
135. See infra app., tbl. 2.
136. See infra app., tbl. 2.
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would follow Delaware law, 137 and Delaware does reject marketability
discounts. 138
The Colorado court also listed five states, in addition to Illinois, that
accepted marketability discounts. 139 However, table 4 lists only four
states 140 because the Virginia case1 41 that interpreted Maryland law as
allowing discounts was decided before a later Virginia decision in
which the court rejected discounts. 142
Subsequent to Independence Tube, twenty jurisdictions have rejected
marketability discounts. 143 Only two jurisdictions, Florida in 1999 and
Nevada in 1998, have accepted them. 144 The court in the Florida
decision stated that it was simply following New York, 145 and the
Nevada case was decided by a federal court that cited no authority for
its decision. 146
What has led to the overwhelming rejection of both minority and
liquidity discounts over the past ten years? Courts generally have come
to appreciate the policy reasons set forth in the previous section, 147
particularly the conflict of interest that characterizes squeeze-outs and
freeze-outs. As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in Harnett, a case
relied upon by many of the decisions this past decade:
More important, to fail to accord to a minority shareholder the full
proportionate value of his shares imposes a penalty for lack of control,
and unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may reap a
windfall from the appraisal process by cashing out a dissenting
shareholder, a clearly undesirable result. 148
137. Woolf v. Universal Fid. Life Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).
138. Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1144-45.
139. Pueblo Bancorp., 63 P.3d at 367 (listing Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Virginia, New York,
and Oregon).
140. See infra app., tbl. 4.
141. McDonough v. Alpha Constr. Eng'g Corp., No. 12757, 1994 WL 1031191, at *3 (Va.
Cir. Ct. May 19, 1994).
142. See U.S. Inspect, Inc. v. McGreevy, No. 160966, 2000 WL 33232337, at *10 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Nov. 27, 2000).
143. The states and years of rejection are as follows: Maine, Missouri (1989); Rhode Island
(1991); Nebraska (1994); South Carolina (1995); Iowa (1996); Kansas, New Jersey, North
Carolina (1999); Georgia, Minnesota, Virginia (2000); Arizona, Connecticut, South Dakota
(2001); Alabama, Indiana, Utah, Washington (2002); Colorado (2003). See infra app., tbl. 2.
144. See infra app., tbl. 4.
145. Munshower v. Kolbenheyer, 732 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
146. Steiner Corp. v. Benninghoff, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1129 (D. Nev. 1998). The court did
reduce the discount from 60% to 25% and suggested that discounts were inequitable. Id.
147. See supra Part IV.A (explaining the reasons for rejecting minority and marketability
discounts).
148. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989).
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The supreme court decision in Harnett was handed down subsequent
to Independence Tube and thus Illinois courts did not have the benefit of
its reasoning. Nor did the Independence Tube court have the benefit of
the numerous decisions that now recognize that "discounts defeat
legislation enacted to protect the minority's right to dissent." 149  As
previously discussed, once minority shareholders lost their veto power
over cash-out mergers, for example, they were at the mercy of the
majority. 150 Dissenters' rights were conferred to protect the minority
from overreaching by the majority.' 5 1
Two other developments are also significant. In 1992, the American
Law Institute approved the following standard for determining "fair
value":
The fair value of shares ... should be the value of the eligible holder's
proportionate interest in the corporation, without any discount for
minority status or, absent extraordinary circumstances, lack of
marketability. 152
The introductory note to the appraisal chapter embodying the above
standard of fair value recognized that the appraisal or dissenters' rights
process is critical to corporate governance since majoritarian control
creates the risk that the majority may abuse the power it has, for
example, by voting for a transaction "that eliminates the minority's
interest in the corporation at an unfairly low price." 153 Section 7.22(a)
is now incorporated in the final draft of the Principles of Corporate
Governance approved in 1994 ("ALl Principles of Corporate
Governance").
Four years after the official promulgation of the ALl Principles of
Corporate Governance, the American Bar Association proposed
amending the Model Act to define fair value substantially in accordance
with the ALI language. 154  The proposal sought to amend section
13.01(4)(iii) of the Model Act1 55 to state, in part, that "fair value" meant
149. Hansen v. 75 Ranch Co., 957 P.2d 32, 42 (Mont. 1998) (referencing decisions in
Delaware, Rhode Island, Iowa, Missouri, Maine, California, Colorado, and Oregon.)
150. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24 (explaining consequences of eliminating
unanimous vote requirements for corporate transactions).
151. See supra text preceding and accompanying note 19 (noting the need for the Illinois
dissenters' fights statute); supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons
behind dissenters' fights statutes).
152. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §7.22(a) (Proposed Final Draft 1992).
153. Id. at pt. VII, ch. 4, introductory note.
154. Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA, Proposed Changes in the Model Business Corporation
Act-Appraisal Rights, 54 BUS. LAW. 209, 210, 215-16 (1998).
155. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 3D §13.01(4)(iii) (1984) (amended 1999).
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the value of the shares "without discounting for lack of marketability or
minority status."' 156 The proposal was adopted the following year.157
The rationale for the Model Act change was substantially similar to
that set forth in the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance:
marketability and minority discounts are generally inappropriate
"because most transactions that trigger appraisal rights affect the
corporation as a whole and because such discounts give the majority the
opportunity to take advantage of minority shareholders who have been
forced against their will to accept the appraisal-triggering
transaction."1 58
Thus, both the American Law Institute and the American Bar
Association, in rejecting discounts, were concerned about the potential
abuse of power by those in control. As discussed throughout this
article, the conflicts of interest that inhere in squeeze-out and freeze-
outs, with the attendant transfer of value from the minority to the
majority in control of the corporation, require courts to protect the
interests of minority shareholders.
Undoubtedly, the endorsement of these two organizations has
influenced courts in rejecting minority and marketability discounts.
V. CONCLUSION
As court after court has recognized, discounts, whether minority or
marketability, transfer value from the minority shareholder, for whose
benefit the statutes were enacted, to the majority shareholder. While
there are numerous other arguments against discounting minority shares
in dissenters' rights or oppression cases, this is the key concept to
appreciate.
Illinois' acceptance of discounts is inconsistent with the historic role
of Illinois courts in protecting minority shareholders. Today, it is also
contrary to the approach taken by an overwhelring number of courts
around the country, which have rejected discounts. While the Illinois
Supreme Court accepted discounts in Republic Bank, it did so on the
basis of deference to the lower courts. In doing so, however, it clearly
emphasized that lower courts need not apply discounts.
In view of the overwhelming weight of authority against discounts, it
is time for the Illinois courts to join the majority, recognize that the
156. Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA, supra note 154, at 210.
157. Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act
Pertaining to Appraisal Rights and to Fundamental Changes-Final Adoption, 55 Bus. LAW.
405 (1999).
158. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 154, at 256.
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issue is one of law in defining fair value, and reject both minority and
marketability discounts. Otherwise, the trial courts will continue to
defer to valuators who in turn defer to the attorneys, thus leaving us in
the paradoxical situation where the opinion of a trial attorney trumps the
view of the supreme court.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
APPENDIX
TABLE 1
JURISDICTIONS REJECTING MINORITY DISCOUNTS
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Offenbecher v. Baron Servs., Inc., No. 2000025, 2002
Alabama WL 959833, at *6 (Ala. Civ. App. May 10, 2002)
(implicitly) (rejecting marketability discounts even though such
discounts "can claim more theoretical support than the
minority discount" (quoting 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL &
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 5.32 (2d ed. 1999))), affid
sub nom. Exparte Baron Servs., Inc., No. 1011635, 2003
WL 1787932 (Ala. 2003).
Pro Finish USA, Ltd. v. Johnson, 63 P.3d 288, 293 (Ariz.
Arizona Ct. App. 2003) (relying upon the majority rule). "The
value of the dissenters' proportionate interest is to be
determined 'without any discount for minority status or,
absent extraordinary circumstances, lack of
marketability."' Id. (quoting AM. LAW. INST.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.22(a) (1994)).
Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 154 Cal. Rptr. 170,
California 176 (Ct. App. 1979) (stating that if minority shares could
be discounted, "the very misconduct and unfairness
which provoked the minority shareholders [to sue could]
be used further to oppress them").
M Life Ins. Co. v. Sapers & Wallack Ins. Agency, 40
Colorado P.3d 6, 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) ("[M]inority discount
was not applicable as a matter of law.").
Devivo v. Devivo, No. CV 980581020, 2001 WL
Connecticut 577072 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 2001). The court
found that fair value is "the value of the corporation as a
whole... allocate[d] to the shares of the petitioning
shareholder in proportion to [his] percentage interest."
Id. at *5. In addition, relying upon the majority rule and
the ALI, and confirmed by the provisions of the
agreement in question, the court stated that "discounts
for lack of control or marketability should not be allowed
in determining fair value." Id. at *9.
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159. The court recognized the ALl "extraordinary circumstances" test may make
marketability discounts a mixed question of law and fact.
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Civ. A Nos. 7959-60,
Delaware 7967-68, 1988 WL 15816, at *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22,
1988) (finding that "'minority' and 'nonmarketability'
discounts ... are improper under Delaware law"), aff'd,
564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
Blitch v. Peoples Bank, 457, 540 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Ga.
Georgia Ct. App. 2000) (relying upon the majority view and the
1999 Model Act, and, in effect, overruling At. States
Constr. v. Beavers, 314 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)).
"[A] court should not apply minority or marketability
discounts in determining the fair value of dissenters'
shares. Rather, .. . a shareholder should generally be
awarded his or her proportional interest in the
corporation after valuing the corporation as a whole." Id.
(citation omitted).
Wenzel v. Hopper & Galliher, P.C., 779 N.E.2d 30, 39-
Indiana 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (relying upon the reasoning of
the majority cases). "Accordingly, we hold as a matter
of law that the trial court erred in applying minority and
marketability discounts .. .. "159 Id.
Sec. State Bank v. Ziegeldorf, 554 N.W.2d 884, 889
Iowa (Iowa 1996) ("[W]e have refused to allow the value of
the dissenter's shares to be discounted because they
represent a minority interest in the corporation. Such a
discount 'in effect would let the majority force the
minority out without paying it its fair share of the value
of the corporation."' (quoting Woodward v. Quigley, 133
N.W.2d 38, 43 (Iowa 1965))).
20041
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank, 992 P.2d 216, 220
Kansas (Kan. 1999) (overruling Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 630
P.2d 167, 177 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981)). The court stated
that because discounts "enable the majority shareholders
to seize the minority shareholders' interest in the
corporation to the extent a minority or marketability is
allowed ... [w]e hold that minority and marketability
discounts are not appropriate when the purchaser of the
stock is either the majority shareholder or the corporation
itself." Id.
In re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co.,
Maine 565 A.2d 997, 1004-05 (Me. 1989) ("Our view of the
appraisal remedy is obviously inconsistent with the
application of minority and nonmarketability
discounts.... Any rule of law that gave the shareholders
less than their proportionate share of the whole firm's
fair value would produce a transfer of wealth from the
minority shareholders to the shareholders in control.").
BNE Mass. Corp. v. Sims, 588 N.E.2d 14, 19 (Mass.
Massachusetts App. Ct. 1992) ("The task assigned to the court... is not
to reconstruct an 'intrinsic value' of each share of the
enterprise but, rather, to determine what a willing buyer
realistically would pay for the enterprise as a whole ....
Only in this fashion can minority stockholders be assured
that insiders in control of a company, burdened by
conflicting interests, may not purchase the enterprise at a
price less than that obtainable in the marketplace of
qualified buyers and avoid paying a full and fair price to
the minority.").
MT Props., Inc. v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 481 N.W.2d
Minnesota 383, 388 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) ("[B]ecause the
legislature has enacted the statute with the evident aim to
protect the dissenting shareholder, we must prohibit
application of minority discounts when determining 'fair
value' in statutory dissenter's rights cases in Minnesota.
This result is also in accord with the approach of the
majority of states .... ).
Compare Dreiseszun v. FLM Indus., 577 S.W.2d 902,
Missouri 909-10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that "this court
(implicitly) refuses to ascribe to the Legislature any intention to
permit the majority stockholders ... to... fritter away
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any right of the minority shareholders" and accordingly
entitling plaintiffs to the 'pro rata value' of their stock),
with King v. F.T.J., Inc., 765 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) ("The application of a 7% minority discount
was supported by the evidence .... "). For a more recent
decision, see Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 486,
496-497 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e are not bound by
Missouri's intermediate appellate court ... [because] we
conclude that if deciding the issue today, the Missouri
Supreme Court would follow the compelling logic of the
current trend toward disallowing minority and
marketability discounts [as a matter of law] in dissenting
shareholders' fair value appraisal determinations.").
Hansen v. 75 Ranch Co., 957 P.2d 32, 42 (Mont. 1998)
Montana (overruling McCann Ranch, Inc. v. Quigley-McCann,
915 P.2d 239 (Mont. 1996), and stating, "We further
conclude that application of a minority discount is
inappropriate when minority shareholders in a close
corporation sell their shares to the corporation or
majority shareholders in a situation controlled by the
dissenters' rights statute.").
Rigel Corp. v. Cutchall, 511 N.W.2d 519, 526 (Neb.
Nebraska 1994) ("[I]n the event of a merger, neither a minority
discount nor a deduction for lack of marketability is to be
given in determining the fair value of a dissenter's
shares .... Only by not doing so can the statutory
policy of fully compensating a dissenting minority
shareholder be achieved.").
Lawson Mardon Wheaton, Inc. v. Smith, 734 A.2d 738,
New Jersey 749 (N.J. 1999). Citing the ALl Principles, the court
(implicitly) stated that fair value should be determined pro rata
"without any discount for minority status." Id.
However, a minority discount was not in issue. See id.
Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 349
New York (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) ("[A] minority interest in closely
held corporate stock should not be discounted solely
because it is a minority interest."); see also Friedman v.
Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972, 977 (N.Y. 1995)
(rejecting minority discounts).
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Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., No. 97 CVS
7201999, WL 33545516, at *13 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 3,
1999) ("The Court believes that North Carolina law does
not favor application of discounts for lack of control or
lack of marketability under these circumstances ... 
affd, 529 S.E.2d 515 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
Fisher v. Fisher, 568 N.W.2d 728, 732 (N.D. 1997)
North Dakota (stating, upon review of other jurisdictions, "We agree a
trial court ascertaining 'fair value' of minority shares
under the [BCA] should not automatically discount their
value."). 160
Woolf v. Universal Fid. Life Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 1093,
Oklahoma 1095 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992) ("We hold that the trial court
erred in applying a [minority] discount to the value of
Shareholders' stock." (relying on Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989))).
Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207, 214 (Or.
Oregon Ct. App. 1988) ("To include a minority discount would
simply penalize him while allowing the corporation to
buy his shares cheaply. That is not the protection that
the legislature had in mind or that other courts have
provided.").
Charland v. Country View Golf Club, Inc., 588 A.2d
Rhode Island 609, 612 (R.I. 1991) ("We agree with the rationale of
Brown and hereby adopt the rule that [in a buy-out
alternative remedy] we shall not discount the shares
solely because of their minority status.").
Morrow v. Martschink III, 922 F. Supp. 1093, 1105
South Carolina (D.S.C. 1995) ("This court concludes that no minority
discount or marketability discount should be applied to
reduce the fair value of Plaintiffs shares. These
discounts have not been recognized in South Carolina in
the context of corporate dissolution actions and have
been rejected by many courts.").
160. Fisher v. Fisher is a divorce case but the court applied a "fair value" standard under an
alternative remedy buy-out statute.
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First W. Bank Wall v. Olsen, 621 N.W.2d 611, 618 (S.D.
2001) (agreeing "with the reasoning of Cavalier Oil
[Del.] and its progeny" and holding as "inappropriate"
the application of "a minority discount when determining
the fair value of dissenter's shares").
Hogle v. Zinetics Med., Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 91 (Utah 2002)
(after discussing minority and marketability discounts,
the supreme court stated that the trial court "should not
employ discounts in its valuation of the Minority's
shares").
Waller v. Am. Int'l Distribution Corp., 706 A.2d 460,
463 (Vt. 1997) ("[T]he 'minority discount' is
inappropriate where the court has found oppression of
the minority."); In re 75,629 Shares of Common Stock,
725 A.2d 927, 935 (Vt. 1999) ("[T]here was no legal
error in applying a [30%] control premium to adjust a
valuation that reflected publicly traded minority
interests.").
U.S. Inspect, Inc. v. McGreevy, No. 160966, 2000 WL
33232337, at *10-11 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 2000)
(relying upon the substantial majority of jurisdictions and
the ALL, and stating that "this court... finds that no
minority discount should be applied in determining the
fair value of shares").
Robblee v. Robblee, 841 P.2d 1289, 1295 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1992) ("'Dave's ownership will go to almost 80%
and he will be ridding himself of a minority shareholder
who had become, and would continue to be, extremely
difficult.' This, though, is one of the very reasons a
minority shareholder's stock should not be discounted to
fair market value, because the value to Dave is different
from what it would be in the market. Where no market
was involved in valuing Neil's shares, and Dave had
strong incentive to buy them, we find no justification in
these facts for the application of a fair market value
minority discount.").
HMO-W Inc. v. SSM Health Care Sys., 611 N.W.2d
250, 258 (Wis. 2000) ("We conclude that [the dissenters'
rights statute] does not permit the application of a
minority discount in determining the fair value of a
Utah
Vermont
*1*
Virginia
4
Washington
Wisconsin
2004]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
dissenter's shares. A minority discount runs contrary to
the protective purpose of the dissenters' rights
statute . . ").
TABLE 2
JURISDICTIONS REJECTING MARKETABILITY (LIQUIDITY) DISCOUNTS
Alabama
Arizona
Colorado
Connecticut
~1*
Offenbecher v. Baron Servs., Inc., No. 2000025, 2002
WL 959833, at *4-*6 (Ala. Civ. App. May 10, 2002)
(relying in part on the 1999 Model Act in calculating
value "as a matter of law.., without regard to the 50
percent 'marketability' discount espoused by [the
valuation expert]"), aff'd sub nom. Exparte Baron Servs.,
Inc., No. 1011635, 2003 WL 1787932 (Ala. 2003).
Pro Finish USA, Ltd. v. Johnson, 63 P.3d 288, 293 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003) (relying upon the majority rule). "The
value of the dissenters' proportionate interest is to be
determined 'without any reference for minority status or,
absent extraordinary circumstances, lack of
marketability."' Id. (citation omitted).
Pueblo Bancorp. v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 368-69
(Colo. 2003) (relying upon the 1999 Model Act, the AL,
and the national trend in other jurisdictions). 16 1 ,The
trial court must determine the value of the corporate
entity and allocate the dissenting shareholder his
proportionate ownership interest of that value, without
applying a marketability discount at the shareholder
level." Id.
Devivo v. Devivo, No. CV980581020, 2001 WL 577072
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 2001). The court stated that
fair value is "the value of the corporation as a
whole... allocate[d] ... to the shares of the petitioning
shareholder in proportion to [his] percentage interest."
Id. at *5. In addition, relying upon the majority rule and
the ALI, and confirmed by the provisions of the
agreement in question, the court stated that "discounts for
161. With respect to the ALl Model Act exception for marketability discounts in
extraordinary circumstances, such issue was not before the court but the court recognized that
such exception is very limited.
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lack of control or marketability should not be allowed in
determining fair value." Id. at *9.
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Civ. A Nos. 7959-60,
Delaware 7967-68, 1988 WL 15816, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22,
1988) (rejecting minority and nonmarketability
discounts).
Blitch v. Peoples Bank, 540 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Ga. Ct.
Georgia App. 2000) (relying upon the majority view and the 1999
Model Act, and, in effect, overruling Atd. States Constr. v.
Beavers, 314 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)). "[A]
court should not apply minority or marketability
discounts in determining the fair value of dissenters'
shares. Rather, . . . a shareholder should generally be
awarded his or her proportional interest in the corporation
after valuing the corporation as a whole." Id. (citation
omitted).
Wenzel v. Hopper & Galliher, P.C., 779 N.E.2d 30, 39-4
Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (relying upon the reasoning of the
majority cases). "Accordingly, we hold as a matter of
law that the trial court erred in applying minority and
marketability discounts. .. ." Id.
Sec. State Bank v. Ziegeldorf, 554 N.W.2d 884, 890
Iowa (Iowa 1996) ("To allow a marketability discount under
this record would undermine the legislature's intent to
protect minority shareholders from being forced out at a
price below the fair value of their pro-rata share of the
corporation.").
Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank, 992 P.2d 216, 220
Kansas (Kan. 1999) (stating that discounts "enable the majority
shareholders to seize the minority shareholder's interest
in the corporation to the extent a minority or
marketability discount is allowed" and holding that
"minority and marketability discounts are not appropriate
when the purchaser of the stock is either the majority
shareholder or the corporation itself').
In re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co.,
Maine 565 A.2d 997, 1004-05 (Me. 1989) ("Our view of the
appraisal remedy is obviously inconsistent with the
application of minority and nonmarketability
discounts.... Any rule of law that gave the shareholders
less than their proportionate share of the whole firm's fair
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value would produce a transfer of wealth from the
minority shareholders to the shareholders in control.").
Advanced Communication Design, Inc. v. Follett, 615
Minnesota N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn. 2000). "[F]air value in a court-
ordered buy-out... means a pro rata share of the value of
the corporation as a going concern without discount for
lack of marketability." Id. (relying upon ALI's no
discount "except in extraordinary circumstances"
standard). Note that in this case, the court held that
where the appraised value of the shares of a minority
shareholder in a court-ordered buyout (pursuant to the
MBCA) results in an unfair wealth transfer from
remaining shareholders to the minority shareholder, an
extraordinary circumstance is presented warranting the
application of a marketability discount. Id. at 293. This
is an extraordinarily rare situation.
King v. F.T.J., Inc., 765 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Mo. Ct. App.
Missouri 1989) ("[I]t cannot be said the trial judge erred by failing
to apply a lack of marketability discount .... ); see also
Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc. 243 F.3d 486, 494, 496-97
(8th Cir. 2001). "[N]o Missouri court has ever applied a
discount for lack of marketability." Id. at 494. "[W]e are
not bound by Missouri's intermediate appellate
court... [because] we conclude that if deciding the issue
today, the Missouri Supreme Court would follow the
compelling logic of the current trend toward disallowing
minority and marketability discounts [as a matter of law]
in dissenting shareholders' fair value appraisal
determinations." Id. at 496-97.
Rigel Corp. v. Cutchall, 511 N.W.2d 519, 526 (Neb.
Nebraska 1994) ("[I]n the event of a merger, neither a minority
discount nor a deduction for lack of marketability is to be
given in determining the fair value of a dissenter's
shares .... Only by not doing so can the statutory policy
of fully compensating a dissenting minority shareholder
be achieved.").
Lawson Mardon Wheaton, Inc. v. Smith, 734 A.2d 738,
New Jersey 749 (N.J. 1999). Although the lower courts had "found
that the present case falls within the 'extraordinary
circumstances' exception to the general prohibition
against applying a marketability discount," the court
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disagreed. Id. However, in Balsamides v. Protameen
Chemicals, 734 A.2d 721, 733-35 (N.J. 1999), the court
applied the "extraordinary circumstances" exception to
no discount when the court permitted the plaintiff
oppressed shareholder to buy out the other shareholder
who had breached his fiduciary duties to plaintiff and the
company.
Royals v. Piedmont Electric Repair Co., No. 97 CVS
North Carolina 7201999, WL 33545516, at *13 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 3,
1999) ("The Court believes that North Carolina law does
not favor application of discounts for lack of control or
lack of marketability under these circumstances . . .
afftd, 529 S.E.2d 515 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
Charland v. Country View Golf Club, Inc., 588 A.2d 609,
Rhode Island 613 (R.I. 1991) ("We therefore today adopt the rule of
not applying a discount for lack of marketability in [buy-
out alternative remedy] proceedings.").
Morrow v. Martschink III, 922 F. Supp. 1093, 1105
South Carolina (D.S.C. 1995) ("This court concludes that no minority
discount or marketability discount should be applied to
reduce the fair value of Plaintiffs shares. These
discounts have not been recognized in South Carolina in
the context of corporate dissolution actions and have been
rejected by many courts.").
First W. Bank Wall v. Olsen, 621 N.W.2d 611, 619 (S.D.
South Dakota 2001) ("This [marketability] discount is especially
inapplicable in a dissenters' rights context, as a ready
market does exist for the dissenters' shares, namely the
majority shareholder or the corporation itself. To apply a
non-marketability discount to the dissenters' shares
would 'unfairly enrich[] the majority shareholders who
may [attempt to] reap a windfall from the appraisal
process. .. ."' (quoting Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett,
564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989))).
Hogle v. Zinetics Med., Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 91 (Utah 2002)
Utah (noting, after discussing minority and marketability
discounts, that the trial court "should not employ
discounts in its valuation of the Minority's shares").
U.S. Inspect, Inc. v. McGreevy, No. 160966, 2000 WL
Virginia 33232337, *12. (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 2000) ("[T]his
court adopts the reasoning of the Delaware, New Jersey
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and Maine Supreme Courts that the policies underlying
dissenting shareholder statutory schemes are inconsistent
with the imposition of marketability discounts, absent
extraordinary circumstances.").
Matthew G. Norton Co. v. Smyth, 51 P.3d 159, 167
Washington (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) ("[T]o the extent that the trial
court's order was intended to declare that, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no such [marketability]
discount can be applied at the shareholder level, we
affirm.").
TABLE 3
JURISDICTIONS ACCEPTING MINORITY DISCOUNTS
Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (N.D.
Mississippi Miss. 1985) ("[T]he court concludes that in the present
(federal court) case a minority discount is proper in determining the fair
value of the stock of the dissenters.").
McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232,
New Mexico 243-45 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding, in an
oppression case, a minority discount under a "fair and
reasonable price" standard articulated by the trial court in
framing an alternative remedy to dissolution, and relying
on tax cases to support the minority discount).
TABLE 4
JURISDICTIONS ACCEPTING MARKETABILITY (LIQUIDITY) DISCOUNTS
Munshower v. Kolbenhayer, 732 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla.
Florida Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ("[W]e rely on New York case law
as persuasive. .. ").
Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d
553, 556-57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
Steiner Corp. v. Benninghoff, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1129
Nevada (D. Nev. 1998) (rejecting a 60% marketability discount
(federal court) and instead applying a 25% discount on the basis that "[i]t
would be inconsistent to allow a company to force
minority shareholders to sell their shares back to the
corporation, but to reduce the price the corporation had to
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pay for those shares because no one would ever want to
buy them," but without citing any case authority to justify
any discount).
Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 349
New York (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) ("A discount for lack of
marketability is properly factored into the equation
because the shares of a closely held corporation cannot be
readily sold on a public market.").
Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207, 213 (Or. Ct.
Oregon App. 1988) (upholding the applicability of a marketability
discount "to reflect the potential volatility in Columbia's
enterprise value.., as well as the marketability problems
that affect the shares of all closely held corporations").
TABLE 5
ILLINOIS CASES
Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine, 179 Ill. App. 3d 911, 918, 535 N.E.2d
927, 931 (1988) ("[W]e find persuasive the fact that other [s]tates which have
similar provisions do use such discounts when appropriate.... Thus it may be
appropriate for the trial court to consider a minority interest factor or a lack of
marketability factor.").
Hickory Creek Nursery, Inc. v. Johnston, 167 I11. App. 3d 449, 455, 521
N.E.2d 236, 239-40 (1988) ("[W]e find such discounting does not apply in the
instant case when a minority interest is being assumed by the remaining
shareholders resulting in a substantial pro rata increase in their share and
control of the corporation.").
Inst'l Equip. & Interiors, Inc. v. Hughes, 204 I11. App. 3d 922, 930, 562
N.E.2d 662, 667-68 (1990) ("The trial court correctly held that the fair-
market-value method did not apply in a situation where a dissenting minority
shareholder in a closely held corporation was being bought out by a majority
stockholder."). The court further held that it was not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to refuse to apply an illiquidity discount under the
circumstances. Id.
Stanton v. Republic Bank of S. Chi., 144 Ill. 2d 472, 480, 581 N.E.2d 678, 682
(1991) ("With respect to the Bank's argument that the minority and illiquidity
discounts were arbitrary and lacked foundation, we find that the trial court
acted within its discretion to apply such discounts, even though not required to
do so .. ").
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Weigel Broad. Co. v. Smith, 289 111. App. 3d 602, 608, 682 N.E.2d 745, 750
(1997) ("Applying such discounts, therefore, is left to the trial court's
discretion." (citing to Stanton v. Republic Bank of S. Chi., 144 I11. 2d at 479,
581 N.E.2d at 682)).
